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In the Courts: State Views on the Psychological-Parent
and De Facto-Parent Doctrines
By Christina Spiezia
Traditionally, the parental rights of custody and visitation
have belonged to a child’s biological or adoptive parents. Today,
however, the concept of “family” has changed dramatically.
Nontraditional family arrangements are more common than ever, and
the rise of family diversity has challenged the legal system to
reassign parental roles. Family law is primarily a state issue, and thus
state jurisdictions have diverged in their legal responses to changes in
family structure.
Some state legislatures and courts have now adopted and
enforced a psychological-parent or de facto-parent doctrine. The two
doctrines are similar in that they allow courts to recognize a person
who has a parent-like relationship with a child as either “de facto” or
“psychological-parent.” Courts may then view that third party as an
equal to the child’s biological or adoptive parent when determining
visitation, custody, and standing to seek parental rights in court.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the concept of de
facto or psychological-parenting, and state courts are in disagreement
over the legal status of a third party that has a parent-like relationship
with a child. While some jurisdictions have embraced the de facto
and psychological-parent doctrines, others have decisively rejected
them. Several state cases illustrate this legal division and present
arguments on both sides of the de facto or psychological-parenting
debate.
The Michigan Supreme Court declined multiple times to
recognize a psychological-parent doctrine. In Bowie v. Arder, a case
in which a grandmother brought an action seeking custody of the
granddaughter who resided with her, the court acknowledged the
existence of a psychological-parent doctrine, yet refused to apply it.
The court specifically took note of arguments raised for creating
third-party rights to custody as well as subsequent constitutional
issues created by those rights. The court, however, explained that it
was not in a position to make policy judgments regarding the
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doctrine’s application when the Legislature, whose task it is to create
substantive rights, had chosen not to do so. The court ultimately
determined that the Legislature would create such rights for third
parties if public policy so required. Several years later, in Van v.
Zahorik, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with its earlier
statement, that public policy issues related to child custody disputes
were to be resolved by the Legislature and not the judiciary.
Another case in Vermont, Titchenal v. Dexter, similarly
discussed the involvement of two women who had together raised a
child that only one of the women had legally adopted. After the
women’s relationship ended, the adoptive mother’s previous
companion brought suit seeking unsupervised contact with the child.
She argued for the creation of a test to assure that only those third
parties who had developed an “intended and shared de facto-parental
relationship” with a child could petition for visitation. The Supreme
Court of Vermont, however, was not persuaded, and stated that such
a test would need to examine the merits of visitation or custody
petitions on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the court explained, most
cases would require a “full-blown evidentiary hearing” forcing
parents to defend themselves against a wide range of third parties
claiming a parent-like relationship with their child. Consequently, the
court rejected the creation of such a test and held that the woman had
no right to parent-child contact as a de facto-parent.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Utah declined to adopt the
psychological-parent doctrine in Jones v. Barlow. The case involved
two women who, in the course of a romantic relationship, had a child
together through the artificial insemination of Barlow. Two years
later, the relationship ended and Barlow refused to allow Jones any
contact with the child. Jones brought suit against Barlow to obtain
visitation rights, but the court ultimately held that Jones, as a former
partner, did not have standing to seek visitation or custody of the
child by means of the psychological-parent doctrine.
The Supreme Court of Utah, in its reasoning, echoed the
earlier Vermont and Michigan decisions by not enacting a controlling
statutory provision regarding the nature of Jones’ and Barlow’s
relationship, and in refusing to assume the legislative role of crafting
403
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and implementing social policy, which would overstep the judiciary’s
authority. The court further explained that a de facto-parent doctrine
would create an ambiguous and fact-dependent test that would be
difficult to administer uniformly. Thus, the doctrine would fail to
fulfill the “traditional gate-keeping function of rules of standing,” and
would expose parents to claims by a wide variety of individuals
asserting parent-like relationships. Finally, the Supreme Court of
Utah looked to common law, stating that it “evidences a strong
presumption that parental rights shall not be disturbed absent a
determination that the legal parents are unfit.” The court in Barlow
could find “no bedrock principles” on which to effect change in the
common law when there was no substantial agreement that the
change was necessary and when a modification could be better
brought about by legislative action.
In the 1991 New York case of Alison D. v. Virginia M., a
woman who previously had a live-in relationship with a child’s
mother, sought to obtain visitation rights after the relationship ended.
The New York Court of Appeals denied the woman’s argument that
being a de facto-parent gave her standing to bring the claim. The
court asserted a rule that biological parents, assuming fitness, have
the right to the care and custody of their children, and to award
visitation to a third person would impair those rights. Thus, the court
explained parentage under New York law as a derivative of biology
or adoption.
In contrast to states that have decisively blocked de facto or
psychological-parents from obtaining visitation or custody rights, at
least twenty-one states have recognized the doctrines. A 1995
Wisconsin case, In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., sets forth a four-element
test that now provides a common definition of the psychologicalparent doctrine. Other states, including California, New Mexico, New
Jersey, and Oklahoma have all adopted de facto or psychologicalparent statutes that mirror this test. As In re Custody of H.S.H.-K
illustrates, actually gaining standing to petition for visitation or
custody rights as a de facto or psychological-parent can be
insurmountably difficult.
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In re Custody of H.S.H.-K involved a woman who was
seeking visitation of the child she raised with her former same-sex
partner, who had been artificially inseminated. The child’s biological
mother opposed the visitation, arguing that she had a constitutional
right to determine who could visit her child. The court, while
“mindful of preserving a biological or adoptive parent’s
constitutionally protected interests and the best interest of a child,”
ultimately concluded that a circuit court has the power to hear a
petition for visitation once two conditions are met. First, a plaintiff
must show that she has a parent-like relationship with the child. That
objective, however, is difficult to accomplish. Specifically, to achieve
psychological-parent status, a plaintiff must prove each individual
element of a four-factor test set forth by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. The plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the biological or
adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the establishment of a
“parent-like” relationship between the nonparent and the child; (2)
the nonparent lived in the same household with the child; (3) the
nonparent undertook parental obligations, assumed a “significant
responsibility” for the “care, education and development” of the
child, and contributed toward the child’s support without expectation
of financial repayment; and (4) the nonparent assumed a parental role
for a sufficiently long period of time to have established a “bonded,
dependent relationship parental in nature” with the child.
Even if a plaintiff is able to demonstrate that she qualifies as a
psychological-parent under this four-element test, she still must show
the existence of a “significant triggering event” that justifies state
intervention in the child’s relationship with the biological or adoptive
parent. Such an event may be the disruption in the child’s life caused
by the elimination of his relationship with the psychological-parent.
Only after a plaintiff satisfies this heavy burden may a circuit court
consider whether visitation or custody with the psychological-parent
is in the best interest of the child.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that its approach
was supported by policy considerations. While biological and
adoptive parents have a constitutional right to rear their children free
of unnecessary state intervention, there are cases where the best
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interest of the child overrides a parent’s right. Especially when a
parent consents to and fosters another person’s parent-like
relationship with the child and then substantially interferes with that
relationship. In such a situation, a triggering event notifies the state
that intervention into the constitutionally protected realm of parent
and child might be warranted to protect a child’s best interest.
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K was ultimately remanded to the
lower court to give the plaintiff the opportunity prove, under the fourpart test, that she was a psychological-parent, and further that a
triggering event substantially interfered with her relationship with the
child. The court explained that if she were able to do so, the lower
court would in turn determine whether visitation was in the child’s
best interests.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has also
addressed the standing of a de facto-parent by applying a bestinterests-of-the-child standard, but has done so without a factor test.
In E.N.O. v. L.M.M., the plaintiff, the former same-sex partner of a
child’s birth mother, sought visitation and custody against the birth
mother’s wishes. Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiff was the
child’s de facto-parent. The court explained that “recognition of a de
facto parent is in accord with notions of the modern family” because
nontraditional families, including same gender couples, are becoming
increasingly common. The court further noted that it is to be expected
that children of nontraditional families form relationships with de
facto-parents just as they do with legal parents.
Consistent with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized that a parent’s
constitutional rights can be outweighed if a court determines that a
third party relationship is in the best interests of the child. The court
explained that a biological parent’s interest in protecting the custody
of her child must be balanced against the child’s interest of
maintaining a relationship with the de facto-parent. In this case, the
court looked directly at the child’s best interest, deciding that it
tipped the scale in favor of a continued relationship with the plaintiff.
Specifically, the court in E.N.O. considered the following
factors as evidence of de facto-parenthood: the plaintiff attended
406
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doctors’ visits while her former partner was pregnant, was listed on
the child’s birth announcement, expressed her intention to parent the
child, raised the child, shared a residence with the child, supported
the family financially, took on a parental role, was authorized to
make medical decisions for the child, and was called “Mommy” by
the child himself. The court decided that these facts indicated an
attachment to the plaintiff on behalf of the child, and subsequently
granted the plaintiff visitation rights.
Other states adopting the de facto or psychological-parent
doctrines have made various statements supporting their reasoning.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine explained that emotional ties
constitute “a compelling basis for the State’s intervention into an
intact family with fit parents.” In stark contrast to New York’s
decision in Alison D., Pennsylvania courts have noted that a
biological parent’s rights do not extend to “erasing a relationship”
between the biological parent and her former partner, even if she
regrets entering into the relationship with the former partner in the
first place. Further, some state courts have recognized de facto or
psychological-parenthood in specific contexts. While not every
jurisdiction uses the term “de facto” or “psychological-parent,”
certain states effectively allow nonparents to achieve legal parental
status if they qualify under the concept of a de facto or
psychological-parent. Illinois and North Carolina, for example, have
abolished any preference for biological or adoptive parents in
conservatorship placements. Connecticut, Iowa, and New Hampshire
have enacted legislation granting same-sex partners who have no
biological ties to children, but who have bonded with the children
by undertaking parental roles, standing to file conservatorship suits.
Recognizing the de facto or psychological-parent doctrine can
enable courts to protect parent-like relationships when doing so is in
a child’s best interest. Mere adoption of the doctrines need not
infringe upon a biological or adoptive parent’s right to raise a child
because, as seen in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, courts can apply a
rigid standard to determine whether an individual achieves de facto
or psychological-parent status. Thus, recognizing the de facto or
psychological-parent doctrine should not simply grant any nonparent
407
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standing to petition for visitation and custody. In fact, as a safeguard
to parental rights, courts adopting the doctrines should decline to
consider most third parties as psychological-parents. In the rare
instance, however, where an individual truly serves as a de factoparent, the court should develop a clear, yet strict test to apply, such
as that created in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.
Ultimately, there are dozens of cases on each side of the
debate as to whether courts should grant de facto and psychologicalparents standing to seek visitation and custody rights. Cases adopting
the doctrines often stand in direct contrast to decisions that refuse to
recognize them, thus illustrating the great divide that exists among
jurisdictions in this area of law. With social diversity and the growing
prevalence of nontraditional family forms, it is certain that the de
facto and psychological-parent doctrines and their application to
parental rights will remain a hotly contested issue in state courts.
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